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Sturgeon v. Frost: Alaska’s Wild Lands
and Wild Laws Prove the Need for a
Mistake-of-Law Defense
Paul J. Larkin, Jr.* & John-Michael Seibler**
Two men walk into a bar. One is Bert Frost, Alaska Regional
Director for the National Park Service (NPS); the other is
Alaskan moose-hunter John Sturgeon, who is riding a hovercraft
(okay, it’s a floating bar). Bert tells John, “Hey, you’re on federal
land, and there is a ban on hovercrafts. I could have you charged
with a crime.” John responds, “No, I’m on state land, and Alaska
permits me to travel by hovercraft.” Bert replies, “Well, I
disagree, but I won’t do anything about it this time. Just don’t
use a hovercraft on federal land again.” Bert finishes his drink
and leaves.
That story reads like the standard “a man walks into a bar”
joke. What makes it different is that those facts describe a case
pending before the Supreme Court of the United States.1 Before it
recesses for the term, the Court will decide whether federal or
state law applies on large and intricately interwoven swaths of
land in Alaska called Conservation System Units (CSUs).2 A
*
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our own.
1. See Sturgeon v. Frost, No. 14-1209 (9th Cir. Feb. 18, 2015),
SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/sturgeon-v-masica/
(last visited Jan. 6, 2016) (detailing the issue of the case and pre-hearing brief
filings of interested parties) [hereinafter Sturgeon] (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
2. See id. (stating the issue of the case as “whether section 103(c) of the
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980 prohibits the National
Park Service from exercising regulatory control over State, Native Corporation,
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ruling for the federal government could make midwinters bleak
for anyone who travels the vast, uninhabited, and unexplored
lands in Alaska—a state twice the size of Texas, with the lowest
population density in the nation3—because the NPS’s rulebook
contains some arcane, strict-liability criminal regulatory
offenses.4 Alaska’s geography and the unpredictable location of
unmarked federal land are the real problem in this case because
they make it difficult to know where state land ends and federal
land begins. Reasonable people will not know what laws apply or
where, and a wrong turn can lead to imprisonment. Accordingly,
this case is a paradigmatic example of the need for a Mistake-ofLaw Defense.5
I. The Facts of Sturgeon v. Frost
In September 2007, John Sturgeon was operating his
hovercraft on a moose hunt, as he had done for more than twenty
years. While stopped on the Nation River to make repairs, armed
NPS agents arrived. After a brief conversation, an agent
“whipped out a rule book” and read, “The operation or use of
hovercraft is prohibited.”6 The agents then did exactly what they
should have done: they likely realized that the man was honestly
and private Alaska land physically located within the boundaries of the
National Park System”).
3. See
Alaska
Kid’s
Corner,
STATE
OF
ALASKA
(2016),
http://alaska.gov/kids/learn/population.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2016) (“Alaska
contains 586,000 square miles of land. It is . . . two and a half times larger than
Texas . . . .Alaska has .93 square miles for each person in the state; by
comparison, New York has .003 square miles per person.”) (on file with
Washington and Lee Law Review).
4. See, e.g., 54 U.S.C. § 100722 (2012) (imposing strict liability for and
listing the relevant standards and exceptions to causing any injury or
destruction to a National Park System Unit, including through the use of “any
instrumentality”).
5. For an explanation of the mistake of law defense, see Edwin Meese III
& Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering the Mistake of Law Defense, 102 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 725 (2012).
6. Erica Martinson, Alaska-US Power Struggle over Moose Hunter Heads
to the Supreme Court, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Dec. 25, 2015),
http://www.adn.com/article/20151225/alaska-us-power-struggle-over-moosehunter-heads-supreme-court (last visited Jan. 27, 2016) (on file with
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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and reasonably mistaken about the fact that he was on federal
land, probably because there was no sign posted telling Sturgeon
where he was, the agents gave Sturgeon a warning, and let him
haul his hovercraft home with a motor boat.7
Sturgeon believes that he did nothing wrong, however,
because NPS regulations did not apply. In his opinion, Congress,
in the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980
(ANILCA), left control over all non-federal land within CSUs to
the state.8 That is true even though large tracts of federal and
non-federal land overlap. Sturgeon sued the federal government
hoping to persuade the courts that he is right. While the state of
Alaska is on Sturgeon’s side, the lower federal courts ruled
against Sturgeon and Alaska, holding that NPS regulations apply
to CSUs, which means that hovercraft usage is prohibited.9 The
Supreme Court granted review and heard oral argument in
January 2016.10
Perhaps, John Sturgeon will once more ride his hovercraft
down the Nation River; perhaps he will not. “But one thing is
certain: The case is no longer solely about one man and his
boat.”11 The numerous organizations that have filed amicus briefs
in the Supreme Court prove how many disparate interests are at
stake.12
7. See id. (“Sturgeon says the federal government shouldn’t have any
authority over the water he was in. Nevertheless, he loaded his hovercraft on a
motor boat and it remains in his yard in Anchorage, the engine mothballed for
safe-keeping, more than eight years later.”).
8. See 16 U.S.C. § 3101(d) (2012) (“Congress believes that the need for
future legislation designating new conservation system units, new national
conservation areas, or new national recreation areas, has been obviated
thereby.”).
9. See Martinson, supra note 6 (discussing Sturgeon’s supporters and the
State of Alaska’s position and brief filings, as well as the disposition of the case
in lower courts); see also Sturgeon v. Masica, 768 F.3d 1066, 1069–71 (9th Cir.
2014) (providing the opinion of the Ninth Circuit on appeal and discussing the
facts and lower court disposition of the case).
10. See Sturgeon, supra note 1 (listing the dates of the certiorari petition
and grant, as well as the dates for arguments).
11. Martinson, supra note 6.
12. Alaska’s congressional delegation (U.S. Senators Dan Sullivan and Lisa
Murkowski; Representative Don Young) filed an amicus brief, and nearly threedozen other organizations filed additional briefs. See Sturgeon, supra note 1
(providing a list of the individuals and organizations that filed amicus briefs).
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Interestingly, even though this dispute began with an alleged
crime, the parties and amici do not discuss the problems that
criminal enforcement of the NPS regulations create for people
like Sturgeon.13 Those problems are serious ones, however, and
arise from two facts: first, vast, uninhabited, unsurveyed areas in
Alaska do not clearly signal when someone has crossed onto
federal property. Second, NPS regulations buried deep within the
Code of Federal Regulations punish conduct that no one would
instinctively assume is wrong. Together, those facts call for
application of a Mistake-of-Law defense.14
II. Regulatory Offenses Raise Particularly Troublesome Notice
Problems for Criminal Law
The NPS agents did not question Sturgeon because he was
committing a violent crime, because he was transporting a
controlled substance like heroin, or even because he was handling
his hovercraft in a reckless manner. No, the agents told Sturgeon
that his use of a hovercraft on federal property was a crime
punishable by imprisonment.15 Given that Article I of the
Constitution grants “[a]ll legislative Powers”16 to Congress, it
might seem odd that the NPS, a federal administrative agency,
would have the authority to define crimes.17 Yet, the Supreme
Court has held that Congress may delegate that power to
agencies. In United States v. Grimaud,18 the Court concluded that
13. See generally Craig W. Richards, Brief of Amicus Curiae State of Alaska
Supporting
Petitioner,
SCOTUSBLOG
(May
4,
2015),
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/141209.Sturgeon.v.Masica.State_.Alaska.Amicus.Brief_.Cert_.Petition.5.4.15....pdf
(offering the full text of Alaska’s amicus brief).
14. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing Mistake-of-Law
jurisprudence).
15. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (defining the regulations in
question and showing that the mere use of “any instrumentality” on the
relevant federal land constitutes a federal offense under the statute).
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
17. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law, and
the Constitutional Regulation of Federal Lawmaking, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
337, 356–59 (2015) (noting that the text of the Constitution appears to grant
Congress exclusive legislative authority).
18. 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
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“the authority to make administrative rules is not a delegation of
legislative power, nor are such rules raised from an
administrative to a legislative character because the violation
thereof is punished as a public offense.”19 Grimaud appears to
end the discussion of the NPS regulations.
Yet it does not; Grimaud only answered the question of
whether Congress may delegate to agencies rulemaking authority
enforceable through the criminal law.20 The answer says nothing
about the entirely separate issues of whether the government has
the obligation to notify the public when agency regulations expose
them to criminal liability and whether the government can
satisfy that burden simply by publishing those rules in the Code
of Federal Regulations. The answers to those questions, it turns
out, are “yes” and “no,” respectively.
A. The Federal Government Must Notify the Public of Federal
Offenses
It is settled law that the Due Process Clause requires the
government to afford everyone notice of the conduct made a
crime.21 The Court has developed three related doctrines to
enforce that requirement. The Rule of Lenity directs courts to
construe ambiguities in criminal statutes in a defendant’s favor.22
The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine prohibits criminal enforcement
of an insolubly ambiguous or indecipherable statute.23 The
19. Id. at 521.
20. See id. (holding that Congress’ grant to a federal agency of the
authority to make administrative rules enforced by the criminal law is not an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power).
21. See, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) (“No one
may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the
meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State
commands or forbids.”); see also Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 459 (2001)
(identifying “core due process concepts of notice, foreseeability, and, in
particular, the right to fair warning as those concepts bear on the
constitutionality of attaching criminal penalties to what previously had been
innocent conduct”).
22. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1088 (2015) (plurality
opinion) (noting that “ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes
should be resolved in favor of lenity”) (internal punctuation omitted)).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (holding
that a criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague if it “fails to give a person of
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Unreasonable Expansion Doctrine prohibits courts from
retroactively applying a statute in an unforeseeable manner.24
Together, those doctrines ensure that no one can be punished
without receiving fair warning of the line between legal and
illegal conduct.25 If that were not the case, the government could
create laws in secret, wait for an unsuspecting person to cross an
invisible line, and then pounce on someone who reasonably
believed that he was law-abiding, a result that the courts have
found intolerable.26 Accordingly, the first question must be
answered affirmatively.
B. Listing Agency Rules in the Code of Federal Regulations Does
Not Invariably Provide Adequate Notice
Here is where the rubber meets the road. The problem for
people like Sturgeon—“a person of ordinary intelligence,”27
precisely the type of person whom the government must
notify28—is that the federal government does not notify them of
ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by
the statute”).
24. See, e.g., Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 352 (1964) (“[A]
deprivation of the right of fair warning can result not only from vague statutory
language but also from an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of
narrow and precise statutory language.”).
25. See, e.g., Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Finding Room in the Criminal Law for the
Desuetude Principle, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. COMMENTS. 1, 3 (2014) (“An elementary
principle of criminal and constitutional law is that the government must
identify particular conduct as criminal so that the average person, without
resort to legal advice, can comply with the law. Three complimentary doctrines
reinforce that principle.”).
26. See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 96 (1945) (plurality
opinion) (“To enforce such a [vague] statute would be like sanctioning the
practice of Caligula who ‘published the law, but it was written in a very small
hand, and posted up in a corner, so that no one could make a copy of it.’”); see
also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, pt. 1, § 2,
at 45 (1753) (noting that Caligula “wrote his laws in a very small character, and
hung them up upon high pillars, the more effectually to ensnare the people.”).
27. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).
28. Criminal laws must be understandable by the average person. See, e.g.,
Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 892 (2014) (noting “the need to express
criminal laws in terms ordinary persons can comprehend”); Connally v. Gen.
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (“[A] statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
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what agency regulations can land them in jail. In fact, the
government makes no effort to notify the public that it has
created any new offenses. The government publishes criminal
statutes in the U.S. Code and agency rules in the Code of Federal
Regulations, but that is the extent of the government’s effort to
notify the public of what is a crime. Beyond that, the government
“privatizes” its notice obligation. The government leaves to
parents, friends, teachers, ministers, other adults in their
communities, the media, and so forth the burden of informing
young and old alike what is unlawful, principally, the argument
goes, because there is no other ready way to provide that
information.29
Historically, the government’s “privatization” has not been a
problem. People learn the mores and customs of the community
from the people just mentioned, and the criminal code only
outlawed conduct that any reasonable person would have known
to be immoral or dangerous (for example, murder, rape, and
theft).30 In addition, the criminal law required the government to
prove in each case that a particular individual acted with an “evil
intent,” known to the criminal law as mens rea.31 The commonmust necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates
the first essential of due process of law.”).
29. See United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 309 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“It may well be true that in
most cases the proposition that the words of the United States Code or the
Statutes at Large give adequate notice to the citizen is something of a
fiction, . . . albeit one required in any system of law[.]”); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr.,
Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189,
207 (1985) (“Publication of a statute’s text always suffices; the government need
make no further effort to apprise the people of the content of the law.”).
30. See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 125 (Belknap
Press 2009) (1881) (“[T]he fact that crimes are also generally sins is one of the
practical justifications for requiring a man to know the criminal law.”); JOHN
SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 427 (8th ed. 1930) (“The common law is in great part
nothing more than common honesty and common sense. Therefore although a
man may be ignorant that he is breaking the law, he knows very well in most
cases that he is breaking the rule of right.”); Livingston Hall & Selig J.
Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 641, 644 (1940)
(“[T]he early criminal law appears to have been well integrated with the mores
of the time, out of which it arose as ‘custom.’”).
31. See Eugene J. Chesney, Concept of Mens Rea in the Criminal Law, 29
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 627, 637–38 (1939) (discussing the historical
progression of evil intent to mens rea).
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law rule was “actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea”32—a crime
consists of “a vicious will” and “an unlawful act consequent upon
such vicious will.”33 Together, those features of the criminal law
prevented morally blameless parties from being convicted.
But those two elements no longer guarantee that the average
person knows where to find the line between what is lawful and
unlawful. The law and life have changed since common law days,
and the Supreme Court has not yet caught up with those
developments.
Beginning in the nineteenth century, legislatures adopted a
series of nontraditional criminal laws known as “public welfare
offenses”34—“infractions, violations, or crimes that can be
committed without any intent to break the law, any knowledge of
what the law is, or even any negligence in learning what the law
prohibits.”35 Public welfare offenses consist in the violation of
health, safety, environmental, housing, and financial rules
designed to protect the public against the hazards of
industrialization, urbanization, and commerce.36 These new
crimes often forbid non-blameworthy conduct and dispense with
any proof of an evil intent, thereby eliminating any consideration
of blameworthiness. Strict liability offenses are categorically
different from common-law crimes.37
32. Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 974 (1932) (“An
act does not make one guilty unless the mind is guilty.”).
33. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, bk. 4, ch. 2, § 20, at 2175; see also, e.g.,
Roscoe Pound, Introduction to FRANCIS BOWES SAYRE, A SELECTION OF CASES ON
CRIMINAL LAW 8–9 (1927) (“Historically, our substantive criminal law is based
upon a theory of punishing the vicious will. It postulates a free agent confronted
with a choice between doing right and doing wrong and choosing freely to do
wrong.”).
34. See, e.g., Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L.
REV. 55, 67 (1933) (“The decisions permitting convictions of light police offenses
without proof of a guilty mind came just at the time when the demands of an
increasingly complex social order required additional regulation of an
administrative character unrelated to questions of personal guilt[.]”).
35. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Strict Liability Offenses, Incarceration, and the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1065, 1067
(2014) [hereinafter Larkin, Strict Liability Offenses].
36. See Sayre, supra note 34, at 67 (noting that public welfare offense first
arose “in the adulterated food and liquor cases” and other regulations necessary
to regulation).
37. “The environmental laws, for example, allow manufacturers to
discharge certain pollutants into the air, water, or land so long as a responsible
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The enactment of those laws created a notice problem that
was unknown to the common law. No longer can the average
person rely on the Decalogue or community norms. Now,
knowledge of intricate rules, sometimes requiring scientific
knowledge, can be required, even though the average person
cannot be expected to know that information. It is reasonable to
enforce strict liability rules through the civil or administrative
process, but using the criminal law to enforce public welfare
offenses can demand too much knowledge of the average person.38
Everyone knows the law forbids murder, rape, and pillaging. Few
know whether garbage is a “hazardous waste.” Given the federal
government’s decision to rely on private parties to provide the
notice required by the Due Process Clause, this transition poses a
grave risk of convicting morally blameless parties because the
burden of providing the necessary information is more than the
community can bear. The average person receives his or her legal
training from other average persons, not from law school
professors, and certainly not from scientists. The result is to
demand that the public not only perform a duty that is properly
the government’s burden to discharge—notifying everyone where
the line between lawful and unlawful conduct lies under federal
statutes—but also sometimes to ensure that everyone is educated
party has a permit for that activity and does not exceed the maximum
authorized amount each period. By contrast, no one can obtain a permit to
commit a bank robbery, and there is no maximum number of burglaries that a
person can commit during a calendar year.” Larkin, Strict Liability Offenses,
supra note 35, at 1093–94 (citations omitted).
38. For that reason, criminal scholars have consistently condemned strict
liability offenses. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 77 (2d ed.
1969) (“Strict criminal liability has never achieved respectability in our law.”);
H.L.A. Hart, Negligence, Mens Rea, and Criminal Responsibility, in H.L.A.
HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 152
(1968) (“Strict liability is odious[.]”); Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a
Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1109 (1952)
The most that can be said for such provisions [prescribing liability
without regard to any mental factor] is that where the penalty is
light, where knowledge normally obtains and where a major burden
of litigation is envisioned, there may be some practical basis for a
stark limitation of the issues; and large injustice can seldom be done.
If these considerations are persuasive, it seems clear, however, that
they ought not to persuade where any major sanction is involved.
See generally Larkin, Strict Liability Offenses, supra note 35, at 1121 n.46
(collecting authorities).
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about highly-reticulated, scientifically-based regulatory schemes
that only a small number of people understand well.
The three doctrines noted above—the Rule of Lenity, the
Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine, and the Unforeseeable Expansion
Doctrine—recognize that there is a limit on the knowledge that
the criminal law can demand a person to have. Regulatory crimes
can often cross that line. While “[i]t is reasonable to expect that
the average person knows not to murder, rape, rob, or swindle
someone else,” it is “unreasonable to assume that that average
person has the same legal knowledge as an attorney, let alone
that he has as much scientific expertise as an agency official with
a doctorate in biochemistry.”39
Two additional factors aggravate the notice problem. First,
legislatures
often
delegate
lawmaking
authority
to
administrative agencies for a variety of reasons, such as the
ability to enable agency officials knowledgeable about a technical
or scientific subject to bring their expertise to bear on newly
emerging problems or newly developed science.40 Those delegations
greatly increase the amount of law that someone must know to
remain law-abiding and can demand far more knowledge than the
average person has. There were only nine felonies at common
law,41 whereas today there are more than 4,000 federal criminal
laws,42 and the number of pertinent regulations has been
estimated to exceed 300,000.43 No one could know all of those
laws44 (remember: one of the NPS agents had to pull out a
39.
40.
41.

Larkin, Strict Liability Offenses, supra note 35, at 1092–93.
Id. at 1088–89.
STUART P. GREEN, 13 WAYS TO STEAL A BICYCLE: THEFT LAW IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 10, 280 n.3 (2012) (reporting that, by the 1160s, the nine
felonies included: murder, rape, manslaughter, robbery, sodomy, larceny, arson,
mayhem, and burglary).
42. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Regulatory Crimes and the Mistake of Law
Defense, HERITAGE FOUND. LEGAL MEMORANDUM No. 157 at 4 (July 9, 2015),
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2015/pdf/LM157.pdf [hereinafter Larkin,
Regulatory Crimes].
43. John Malcolm, Criminal Law and the Administrative State: The
Problem with Criminal Regulations, HERITAGE FOUND. LEGAL MEMORANDUM NO.
130
at
3
(Aug.
6,
2015),
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/LM130.pdf.
44. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871,
1881 (2000) (“Ordinary people do not have the time or training to learn the
contents of criminal codes; indeed, even criminal law professors rarely know
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rulebook to find the hovercraft regulation45), especially because
they do not necessarily mirror any prevailing moral code.46 And
the normal sources of instruction—family, church, community,
and so forth—cannot make up the difference because “the
average person learns the law from other average persons, not
from individuals educated, trained, and experienced in what a
technical regulatory scheme forbids.”47
The second factor stems from how agencies make law.
Agency officials responsible for implementing regulatory schemes
often construe relevant statutes and regulations in publicly
available memoranda called “guidance documents” or “compliance
manuals.”48 Those documents are an important source of law
because the courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of its
governing laws.49 Yet, agencies also may prepare memoranda
outlining criteria to be considered when interpreting laws that
are difficult for the average person to find or that the agency does
not make public. Memoranda like that are “tantamount to
“‘secret’ or ‘underground’” laws.50 Allowing someone to be

much about what conduct is and isn’t criminal in their jurisdictions.”).
45. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (recounting the interaction
between the park agent and Mr. Sturgeon).
46. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 9.3.4, at
731–32 (1978) (“The tight moral consensus that once supported the criminal law
has obviously disappeared. . . . In a pluralistic society, saddled with criminal
sanctions affecting every area of life, one cannot expect that everyone know
what is criminal and what is not.”).
47. Larkin, Strict Liability Offenses, supra note 35, at 1090.
48. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law and the
Constitutional Regulation of Federal Lawmaking, 38 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
337, 384 (2015).
49. See, e.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (deferring to the
Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of regulations regarding disciplinary
deductions of pay); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 865 (1984) (holding that the EPA’s interpretation of a statutory term was
entitled to deference).
50. See Larkin, Strict Liability Offenses, supra note 35 (paraphrasing
Kathleen F. Brickey, Environmental Crime at the Crossroads: The Intersection of
Environmental and Criminal Law Theory, 71 TUL. L. REV. 487, 502–03 (1996)
(“[M]uch of environmental law is hidden in detailed preambles that are not
published in the Code of Federal Regulations with the regulations they explain,
and in private informal guidance memoranda and letters—hence, the problem of
‘underground’ environmental law.”)).
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convicted for violating such memoranda would be like treating
the secret laws of Caligula51 as valid.
For those reasons, mere publication of regulations in the
Code of Federal Regulations of the Federal Register does not
satisfy the Due Process requirement that the government notify
the public of what conduct is a crime, whether or not it is a strict
liability offense.
III. NPS’s Nonobvious Criminal Regulations and Alaska’s Vast,
Wild, and Unmarked Terrain Provide a Paradigmatic Case for
Application of the Mistake-of-Law Defense
Some NPS rules outlaw innocuous conduct, and many
regulations create strict liability. Driving a hovercraft on state
property, for example, is lawful in Alaska, so there is no reason to
presume that people like Sturgeon know that the same conduct is
a crime on federal land. Other kindred NPS regulations are the
following:
• It is a crime to roll something down a hillside or
mountainside.52
• It is a crime to toss a rock into a valley or a canyon.53
• It is a crime to park your car in a way that
inconveniences someone.54
• It is a crime to ski, snowshoe, ice skate, sled, inner
tube, toboggan, or do any “similar winter sports” on a
road or “parking area” “open to motor vehicle
traffic.”55
• It is a crime to “allow” a pet to make a noise that
“frightens wildlife.”56
51. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, pt. 1, § 2, at 46 (describing the
deceptive publishing practices of Caligula).
52. See 36 C.F.R. § 2.1(a)(3) (2015) (“Tossing, throwing or rolling rocks or
other items inside caves or caverns, into valleys, canyons, or caverns, down
hillsides or mountainsides, or into thermal features.”).
53. Id.
54. See id. § 261.10(f) (“Placing a vehicle or other object in such a manner
that it is an impediment or hazard to the safety or convenience of any person.”).
55. Id. § 2.19(a).
56. See id. § 2.15(a)(4) (prohibiting “[a]llowing a pet to make noise that is
unreasonable considering location, time of day or night, impact on park users,
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It is a crime to use aircraft on a hunting or fishing
expedition.57 (Consider here that Alaska’s terrain is so
rugged, that even its capital city of Juneau is
accessible only by plane or boat. So, if you want to go
hunting or fishing from Juneau, and do not know if
you will cross NPS territory, you better take a boat.)
• Depending on how you interpret the word “structure,”
a park employee could determine that it is a crime to
pitch a tent or tree-stand.58
If you think that those crimes seem far removed from
conduct ordinarily understood as blameworthy, you are right.
Criminal law and regulatory law exist for different purposes.
Criminal law “enforce[s] the moral code that every person knows
by heart.”59 By contrast, regulations “efficiently manage
components of the national economy using civil rules, rewards,
and penalties to incentivize desirable behavior without casting
aspersions on violations attributable to ignorance or explanations
other than defiance.”60 Treating conduct as trivial as tossing a
rock down a hillside in the same way that we treat “common-law
crimes like murder, robbery, or theft ‘ignores the profound
difference between the two classes of offenses and puts parties
engaged in entirely legitimate activities without any intent to
break the law at risk of criminal punishment.’”61 Yet, such
regulations are abundant, inaccessible, and out of touch with
•

and other relevant factors, or that frightens wildlife by barking, howling, or
making other noise”).
57. See id. § 13.450(a) (“Notwithstanding the provisions 43 CFR
[§] 36.11(f) the use of aircraft for access to or from lands and waters within a
national park or monument for purposes of taking fish or wildlife for subsistence
uses within the national park or monument is prohibited except as provided in
this section.”).
58. See id. § 261.10(a) (“Constructing, placing, or maintaining any kind of
road, trail, structure, fence, enclosure, communication equipment, significant
surface disturbance, or other improvement on National Forest System lands or
facilities without a special-use authorization, contract, or approved operating
plan when such authorization is required.”). It is a crime to abandon such
personal property. Id. § 261.10(e).
59. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Prohibition, Regulation, and Overcriminalization:
The Proper and Improper Uses of the Criminal Law, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 745,
747 (2014) (internal citations omitted).
60. Id.
61. Larkin, Regulatory Crimes, supra note 42.
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common morals, depriving the average person of adequate notice
of what the law prohibits. For reasons such as those, two former
Attorneys General—Michael Mukasey62 and Edwin Meese III63—
have urged adoption of a Mistake-of-Law defense.
Alaska exemplifies the need for this defense because the
state’s terrain makes the notice problem particularly
complicated.64 Alaska has extraordinarily long days in the
summer and long nights in the winter due to its far northern
latitude.65 The way people live and move around in the state can
be influenced by “[v]iolent storms and fog conditions,”66
whiteouts, and frigid temperatures. Alaska has a “minimum
average January temperature of -20° F” in some interior areas
and “of 18° F” in some coastal areas.67 A region of basins and
plateaus rests in between two immense mountain systems, the
Pacific Mountains and Valleys, and “a northward extension” of
the Rocky Mountains.68 Because these geographic features are

62. See Michael B. Mukasey & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Perils of
Overcriminalization, HERITAGE FOUND., LEGAL MEMORANDUM No. 146 (Feb. 12,
2015),
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/02/the-perils-ofovercriminalization (discussing the recent increase in federal laws that impose
criminal penalties and how this increases the chance of someone being charged
with a crime for an honest mistake).
63. See Meese & Larkin, supra note 5, at 729 (“Legislatures and courts
have made vast changes to the structure of the criminal justice system, to the
officials who comprise that system, and to the procedures that govern how those
actors play their roles.”).
64. See Martha Shulski & H. Michael Mogil, Alaska’s Climate and Weather,
WEATHERWISE
(Jan.–Feb.
2009),
http://www.weatherwise.org/archives/back%20issues/2009/januaryfebruary%202009/full-shulski-mogil.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2016) (explaining
Alaska’s complicated and diverse geography) (on file with Washington and Lee
Law Review).
65. See The Geography of Alaska, ALASKA: HIST. & CULTURAL STUDS.,
http://www.akhistorycourse.org/articles/article.php?artID=123 (last visited Jan.
22, 2016) (discussing how Alaska is made up of four interlinked regions) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
66. See id. (discussing how the geography of Alaska influences the climate
in certain regions).
67. See id. (“Large water bodies such as oceans heat and cool more slowly
than land areas. As a result, coastal areas tend to have less seasonal extremes
than interior or continental areas.”).
68. See id. (listing the four different regions that make up Alaska).
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riddled with “hills, valleys, and rivers,” even geographers ask the
question: “How can we make sense of this complexity?”69
Atop that is the problem that the establishment of Alaska
CSUs have created.70 They are scattered like jigsaw pieces
throughout Alaska, with no obvious rhyme or reason for where
they are located and with no signage indicating where they begin
and end.71 Unlike the signs at an interstate or national border,
the federal government does not demark federal land everywhere.
Without adequate signage, it can be impossible to know when one
is on land subject to federal regulation. A person can unwittingly
cross onto federal land and be subject to new, unforeseeable
crimes. Unlike Alaska’s trespass law, which limits trespass to
cases where an owner has given notice by “posting in a
reasonably conspicuous manner under the circumstances,”72 NPS
regulations have no such requirement. The result is that it can be
impossible to know when you have driven, hiked, skied, or
snowshoed your way onto federal land. For a person traversing
Alaskan terrain, NPS jurisdiction could have the same effect as a
minefield.
The criminal law should not be used to trap an unwitting
public. Anglo-American law has long held that everyone is
presumed to know the law, so ignorance or a mistake of law is no
defense to a crime.73 The Supreme Court recognized in Cheek v.
69. See id. (describing how each region in Alaska is geographically unique).
70. See Rebecca Wilhelm, Supreme Court to Hear Arguments in Alaska
Land-Use Case, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.bna.com/supreme-courthear-n57982066378/
(last visited Jan. 28, 2016) (“In 1980 Congress passed ANILCA, which was
designed to resolve land title disputes between the state and native
corporations. The statute also created conservation system units, establishing
new national parks and bringing lands reserved for Alaska, private parties and
native corporations under federal management.”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
71. An amicus brief filed by Alaska in the Supreme Court contains a map of
the state with disputed areas outlined showing just how complex and
unpredictable they are. See Brief for State of Alaska as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at app. 1, Sturgeon v. Frost, No. 14-1209 (9th Cir. Nov.
23,
2015),
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/141209_amicus_pet_Alaska.authcheckdam.pdf (providing a map of the federal
Conservation System Units within Alaska).
72. ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.350(b)(2) (2015).
73. See, e.g., Meese & Larkin, supra note 5, at 738 (noting that it was
previously acceptable to expect people to be knowledgeable of the law; with the
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United States74 that the rule is “[b]ased on the notion that the law
is definite and knowable.”75 Given the reams of regulations that
exist today, that assumption is no longer true; in fact, it is
laughable.76
Congress and the courts should align the criminal law with
contemporary reality by endorsing a Mistake-of-Law Defense to
protect good people from being tripped up by unknowable rules.
Otherwise, the invisible borders of federal jurisdiction and the
NPS’s strict liability rules will repeat the injustice that the 1997
prosecution of three-time Indy 500 winner Bobby Unser caused.77
The federal government prosecuted Unser for unlawfully
operating a snowmobile on prohibited land even though he
became lost and nearly died in a blinding blizzard.78 Like Unser,
Alaskans—and visitors to that state—are at risk of being subject
to rules that they do not know, in places where they have no way
of knowing that they apply.79
passage of time, however, the law is becoming more complex, making it difficult
for people to know every law).
74. 498 U.S. 192 (1991).
75. Id. at 199.
76. See Mukasey & Larkin, supra note 62 ([T]he sheer number of federal
laws that impose criminal penalties has grown to an unmanageable point.”).
77. See Conn Carroll, Bobby Unser vs. the Feds, DAILY SIGNAL (Mar. 14,
2011), http://dailysignal.com/2011/03/14/bobby-unser-vs-the-feds/ (last visited
Jan. 26, 2016) (discussing concerns with “overcriminalization” and how offenses
that are not morally blameworthy are now being criminalized) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Brian W. Walsh, Traps for the Innocent,
HERITAGE
FOUND.
(Oct.
15,
2010),
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2010/10/Traps-for-the-Innocent
(“Unser was convicted of a federal crime for allegedly operating a snowmobile in
a national wilderness. If he did indeed enter it, he did so unknowingly while he
and a friend were lost for two days and two nights in a ground blizzard.”).
78. See Susan Drumheller, Unser: Blizzard Sent Him off Trail Auto Racing
Champion Recounts Accidental Foray in Wilderness, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Feb. 14,
1997), http://www.spokesman.com/stories/1997/feb/14/unser-blizzard-sent-himoff-trail-auto-racing/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2016) (explaining the events
surrounding Bobby Unser’s citation for snowmobiling in the wilderness of
Colorado) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
79. See Robert Barnes, A Moose-Hunter and His Hovercraft Tell the
Supreme Court Alaska Is Different, WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/a-moose-hunter-and-hishovercraft-tell-the-supreme-court-alaska-is-different/2016/01/18/f9a2e9ee-bb1011e5-b682-4bb4dd403c7d_story.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2016) (discussing
that, because Alaska is a big state, of which the federal government owns 60% of
the land, it is difficult for someone to determine if they are on federal or state
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Finally, a Mistake-of-Law Defense is also straightforward
and easy for courts to apply. The defense would entitle a
defendant to be exonerated if a reasonable person in the
defendant’s position would not have believed—and if the
defendant himself did not believe—that the charged conduct was
illegal.80 That standard focuses on the problem of notice and
directly addresses the notice problem.81 The defense also would
not burden the government. A defendant can be required to bear
the burden of producing evidence to support this defense, as well
as the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence.82
Also, “[a]s a practical matter, a defendant will need to testify at
trial in order to persuade the jury that he did not know that his
conduct was prohibited.”83 Once a defendant testifies the
prosecution can cross-examine him to persuade the jury that he
should not be believed.84 Accordingly, the government will have
ample opportunity to challenge the defense.
Conclusion
Regardless of who wins in Sturgeon v. Frost, the case
demonstrates a compelling need for a Mistake-of-Law Defense.
Sturgeon shows that there can be not only inadequate notice of
what is a crime, but also of where that is the case. NPS’s failure
to mark clearly its jurisdictional borders also reveals why this
defense is necessary: people often have no way of knowing
land) (on file with the Washington and Lee law Review).
80. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Fighting Back Against Overcriminalization: The
Elements of a Mistake of Law Defense, HERITAGE FOUND. (June 12, 2013),
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/06/fighting-back-againstovercriminalization-the-elements-of-a-mistake-of-law-defense (explaining the
elements of the Mistake-of-Law Defense that a defendant will need to prove to
use this defense).
81. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., A Mistake of Law Defense as a Remedy for
Overcriminalization, 26 A.B.A. J. CRIM. JUST. 10, 15–16 (Spring 2013) (setting
forth a draft statute creating a Mistake-of-Law Defense).
82. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Taking Mistakes Seriously, 28 BYU J. PUB. L.
71, 109 n.143 (2013) (collecting cases holding that the defendant can be made to
bear the burdens of production and proof on a defense).
83. Id. at 109.
84. See id. at 108–09 (explaining why there are no other practical problems
with a Mistake-of-Law Defense).
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whether they are on federal land. Because the average person in
the Alaskan wilderness has no notice of all conduct that is a
crime, a Mistake-of-Law Defense is needed to accommodate the
realities of law and life.

